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COMMUNITY INTEREST IN COMMINGLED INCOME,
DERIVED FROM PERSONAL SERVICE AND
SEPARATE CAPITAL-ANOTHER VIEW
BENJAMIN H. KIZER*T HE LAWYERS of this state are deeply indebted to Mr. Francis
A. LeSourd of the Seattle Bar for his thoughtful and scholarly
analysis of "Community Property Status of Income from Business
Involving Personal Service and Separate Capital."' This article gives
special pleasure in that Mr. LeSourd has taken pains to go to the his-
toric roots of the problem-in the Spanish law and in the early deci-
sions of other states. However, I am not at peace with one of Mr.
LeSourd's conclusions. I venture, therefore,. to present an alternative
to the view Mr. LeSourd has taken.
It will be remembered that our Supreme Court has held that where
the income from community services in a substantial amount is inex-
tricably commingled with income from separate capital, it treats the
whole income resulting from the commingling as community income.
but that where the income from such community services is not sub-
stantial, the income is regarded as belonging wholly to the separate
estate. This rule Mr. LeSourd criticizes as "basically not equitable,"
and as an avoidance of the difficulties of the problem.
This commingling of substantial community income with separate
income is of course the important aspect of the rule. There are few
cases, and these of little moment, where the community contribution
is so small that all the income is treated as separate. I shall speak,
therefore, only of this greater commingling
Whether this rule is equitable or not depends, it would seem, on how
we look at the relation of husband and wife, their property and their
income. If we view this relation of the spouses as primarily a property
relation, there is much to be said for Mr. LeSourd's view But if we
look upon it as primarily a matrimonial relation, which the law pro-
tects with its presumptions because it views this matrimonial relation
*LL.B., University of Michigan, 1902, LL.D., Linfield College. Director UNRRA's
China Office, 1944-46; Walker-Ames Professor, University of Washington, 1946-47,
member of law firm of Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane.
122 WASH. L. REv. 19 (Feb., 1947).
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as more important than the property of the spouses, then the view of
our Supreme Court is soundly based.
Let us recall the precise language of our Court on this point. In the
well-known case of Yesler v. Hochstettler2 our Supreme Court said:
During the marriage relation the community property of the spouses is.
and in the nature of things must be, the superior and controlling entity;
its interests are paramount, and whatever, tends to reduce its position must
be exceptional.
Again in Jacobs v. Hoitt3 our Court, in considering this problem of
commingling, said:
Its separate and community natures have become so confused that the
court cannot apportion them, and the favor with which community prop-
erty is regarded, and the presumptions in favor of it are such, etc.
These two paragraphs have been quoted by our Court over and over
in support of its conclusions. To me, they are persuasive of a sound
public policy that has its own equity That policy results in an interest
in the accumulations for each of the spouses during the life of the
community, to which each has contributed by his or her labor. This
policy makes for sound matrimomal relations, and results in an estate
for each when that relation is dissolved.
Furthermore, it is well to remember and give weight to the views of
the statesmen and jurists who framed the rule of the Spamsh law
Their view was that, during the life of the matrimonial relation, all
income, whether from community labor and property or from separate
property, was community property This rule has roots that run deep
into the past of community property law It grows out of a wise human
experience, and is not lightly to be discarded.
Nor can I agree that the Washington rule is merely an avoidance of
a difficult problem. Generally speaking, where the commngling of
separate and community income has been complete as it was in the
case of In re Buchanan's Estate', or in E. I. DuPont de Nemours v.
Garrison5 and in the many other cases that have helped.to build up the
rule in our Court, the problem is not merely difficult. It is utterly insol-
uble save by the use of presumptions or formulas. If we are not satis-
fied with the presumptions of the Spanish law or of our Court, we are
24 Wash. 349, 354, 30 Pac. 378 (1892).
8 119 Wash. 283, 287, 205 Pac. 414 (1922).
489 Wash. 172, 150 Pac. 129 (1916).
513 Wn.(2d) 170, 124 P.(2d) 939 (1942).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
compelled to contrive an arbitrary formula. Such a formula is not a
solution in any equitable sense. It merely cuts through the thicket of
facts with a sword. It creates more inequities than it solves.
Furthermore, if the spouses wish to keep their separate estates free
from commingling with their community estate, they have only to keep
separate accounts, so that the earnings of their respective estates can
be identified by the courts. In this time of heavy income taxes, ac-
counts of all income must be kept by the managing spouse. It would
impose little additional burden to separate the two classes of income
and pay accordingly Such a separation of incomes would be given
effect by our Court, because it would disclose the intent of the parties.
Conversely, where the spouses commingle the separate and com-
munity incomes as completely as they have done in the many cases
referred to above, this continual process of commingling, of itself,
raises a just inference that the parties intend to treat their incomes
from all sources as community property For our Court, then, to reach
such a conclusion is merely to give effect to the intent of the spouses.
What are the alternatives to the Washington rule? There are two
presented by Mr. LeSourd. The first is found in Persera v. Perseral
where in a divorce action in igog, the California Court allowed the
husband seven per cent per annum in simple interest on his separate
estate, treating the substantial balance of the savings of the spouses as
community property
Mr. LeSourd regards the Persera case as a step in the right direction,
but as still falling short of doing justice to the equitable estate of the
spouses. In his view, the nearest approach to an equitable rule is found
in the General Counsel's Memorandum 9825, C. B. X-2, p. 146 (herein
referred to as "GCM 9825"), used in the case of Todd v. Com'rT
If, out of solicitude for the increase of the separate estate of the
spouse and in repudiation of the favor our Court has shown to the
matrimonial relation, we conclude to depart from the Washington rule,
this California rule, made concrete in the Persera case", has something
to commend it; for, in a minority of cases, it might work out by coinci-
dence a fairly equitable result.
But an analysis of the GCM 9825 method discloses that it is simply
a slick formula, designed for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to
create the maximum dislocation of income, that is, to throw prac-
6156 Cal. 1, 103, Pac. 488 (1909).
7 153 F.(2d) 553 (C. C. A. 9, 1945).
8 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
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tically all earnings during the life of the marital community into the
separate estate of one spouse, thus creating the maximum of revenue
for the government, and the rmimum of estate for the other spouse.
This formula reflects the well-known aversion of the Commissioner to
the rules of community property
How well the application of the GCM 9825 formula succeeds in
producing wholly lopsided results is well-illustrated by the Todd case,
supral Here, the separate estates of two brothers, invested in a lumber
business, under the magic of this formula, increases in only six years
from $144,000 to $292,ooo-more than doubled-while a net com-
munity estate for both brothers emerges of only $28,000.
On the face of it, one might suppose that the Commissioner was
bighearted in letting so much as $14,ooo apiece lodge in the two com-
munity estates. But a glimpse at the results for the third of these six
years shows that the Commissioner knows what he is doing. In 1938,
the business earned nearly $40,ooo, and each brother withdrew
$1o,400, surely not an extravagant allowance for annual living ex-
penses in view of their earnings. But by the Bureau's formula, it
resulted in the two community estates incurring a loss to their separate
estates of $3,600, almost wipmg out the small community estates of
just under $6,ooo earned in the two preceding years.
So it is clear that it took the bonanza years in the lumber business
of 1940-41 to create even these small community estates of $14,000
apiece. A couple of bad years, and the inexorable eight per cent, com-
pounded annually on the separate estates, will wipe out this $28,ooo
temporarily allowed to lodge in the two community estates.
It is plain then that the apportionment under GCM 9825 is a mere
formula, and nothing more. It it no yardstick that measures the rela-
tive contributions of management and of capital earnings, save by its
own artificial spse dixit. In the Todd case, the earnings of the Todds'
lumber business might be due overwhelmingly to the energy, thrift,
and business wisdom of the Todds, or almost wholly to the general
prosperity of the lumber business. The formula makes no inquiry It
has no means of measuring these intangibles. It is as arbitrary as the
Procrustean bed.
Furthermore, even as an arbitrary rule it has grave weaknesses. A
managing spouse may fix a small salary for himself, merely because
the business is undercapitalized and he is anxious to get ahead, yet
9 153 F.(2d) 553 (C. C. A. 9, 1945).
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without any intent to increase his separate estate at the expense of the
community estate. His spouse may loyally acquiesce in the penny-
pinching this imposes on both. Nevertheless, under the GCM 9825
formula, the scale is unintentionally weighed heavily in favor of the
separate estate.
Or, on the other hand, the spouses may prefer to treat themselves to
a generous salary from the business so that they may live well or make
other investments, again without reflecting on the consequences. This
course, in its turn, tips the percentage of any overage of income in
favor of their community estate. No one can say that such salary allo-
cations work out equitable results in determining the proportions of
community and separate earnings. But the GCM 9825 formula gives
free play to such accidental determinations.
It should be remembered that the GCM 9825 formula has three
prongs to its spear by which it draws away the lifeblood of all com-
munity labors and income: first is this seven or eight per cent interest
compounded annually on the separate estate; second, if the profits in
any given year exceed this high rate of interest, then the surplus is
divided in the proportion that the amount of the interest on the sepa-
rate estate bears to the salary of the managing spouse; third, the sepa-
rate estate remains unimpaired by withdrawals of the spouses, since
withdrawals in every case are presumed to be for community purposes,
even though it results in running the community estate into debt to the
separate estate.
This inevitably means that if one of the spouses is given a head start
by a separate estate of $25,000 to $50,000, in a long life, with the
usual ups and downs of earnings, the finish will see the separate estate
absorb all of the lifetime earnings of the managing spouse, with no
community estate whatever.
About the time this state entered the Union a young business man
started in business at the time of his marriage with a capital of not
more than $io,ooo. He died fifty-eight years later, leaving surviving
him his wife and an estate of $750,000, all earned in his original
business. Shortly before his death he drew his will in which he recited
the growth of this fortune, and concluded that all of it was community
property, and that the small nest egg with which the business had been
started had little to do with the amassing of what seemed to him a
large fortune.
Yet if we were to apply the three-pronged rule of GCM 9825, every
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dollar of that fortune would have been separate estate. Thus the sur-
viving wife would have had nothing for her fifty-eight years of frugal
living, save only what her deceased spouse might have seen fit to leave
her by will, much diminished by the excessive inheritance taxes levied
on this separate estate.
Such a rigorous rule as tis works out results against the wife, when
it is the husband who had a separate estate at marriage, which are much
harsher than the common law It is little comfort to such a wife to be
told that, if she had had the separate estate instead of her husband,
she would have absorbed all the life's savings of the community, and
her husband would have been left subject to her bounty
It is this test of many years' operation that discloses to the full the
mequlty and the fallacy of the GCM 9825 formula. It was born, not
of any desire to work out equitable results, but only to create maxi-
mum returns in taxes, and to destroy as far as possible the community
property rules that seek primarily the welfare of the community, not
the enhancement of the estate of either spouse at the expense of the
other.
From the Commissioner's standpoint, however, GCM 9825 has an
Achilles' heel. In the Todd case counsel for petitioners apparently
introduced no evidence as to the actual value of the services of the two
partners, relymg on the presumptions established by the Supreme
Court of California in the Periera case* and later cases. This they
would seem to have been justified in doing in view of these Califorma
decisions, until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said they were not
so justified. Accordingly, two recent decisions of the Tax Court well
illustrate the outflanking movement of counsel for petitioners by which
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has been restricted to the inter-
est earned by invested separate capital, the whole of the balance of the
earnings being treated as due to the energy and ability of the taxpayer,
and therefore belonging to the community
In these cases the Tax Court has refused to permit the Comns-
sioner to restrict the community's share in the earnings of the business
to a meager salary The Tax Court has recognized the fact that, in
many cases, the initiative and burden-bearing of a proprietor cannot
be measured in terms of salary, but only in terms of the ups and downs
of business profit.
10 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
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Thus in Lawrence Oliver v. Com'r"I counsel for petitioner intro-
duced evidence showing that the taxpayer displayed great skill and
energy in the upbuilding of his business, and that the profits therefrom
were mainly attributable to the exercise of his personal qualities. Ac-
cordingly, the Tax Court apportioned seven per cent interest to the in-
vested separate capital as its share of the annual net income of the
business, and allocated all greater earnings-and these were quite
considerable-to the community A similar result was reached in
Manning v. Com'r12 (March 12, 1947), although the taxpayer there
conceded a rate of eight instead of seven per cent on his separate capi-
tal. Here the Tax Court showed its awareness of the inequitable results
that may follow upon a general application of the rule of the Todd
case." The Tax Court pointed out that no evidence had been intro-
duced by petitioners in that case to indicate that the allocations made
by the Commissioner were unreasonable, and it further emphasized
the fact that in the Todd case
the partnership had a large capital investment in inventory because it
was thought to be a good investment in view of ascending prices and
the Commissioner and the Tax Court were warranted in inferring that
there was a substantial gain in the capital value of the inventory as dis-
tinguished from earnings from new business obtained.
It is interesting to observe that the Tax Court itself has later found it
necessary to supply a new and sounder ground for the decision of the
Todd case. If the Todd case continues to be thus restricted to its
specific facts, it may become merely a side track, not a main line case.
But there is one other aspect of the Todd case 4 that invites exami-
nation. In that case the Tax Court," confronted with the California
rule, first applied in its present form in the Persera case" and later
developed in the leading cases of Estate of Gold"7 and in the case of
In re McCarthy's Estate,"8 declared that the determination of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the GCM formula 9825 is ap-
plicable, "effectually overcomes the ordinary presumptions of law,"
114 Tax Ct. 684 (1945).
128 Tax Ct. 440 (1947).
is 153 F.(2d) 553 (C. C. A. 9, 1945).
14 Id.
15 3 Tax Ct. 643 (1944).
16 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
17 170 Cal. 621, 151 Pac. 12 (1915).
1s 127 Cal. App. 80, 15 P.(2d) 223 (1932).
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and thereupon departed from the California rule of ascertaining the
fruits of commingled earnings and separate property income.
It is not questioned that the Commissioner's conclusions on issues
of fact should have the weight given them by law But the substantive
rules of law, established by the state courts in determining what is
separate and what is community income, whether these rules grow
out of presumptions or not, are necessarily as binding on the Comns-
sioner of Internal Revenue as they are on the federal courts, if appro-
pnate effect is to be given to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins." In the
late case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,"0 that Court has sardomcally
commented on the pain it gives federal judicial tribunals to follow the
decisions of the state courts. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter there said:
In overruling SWft v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins did
not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of
looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its inade-
quacies had been laid bare. Law was conceived as a "brooding omni-
presence" of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not
themselves the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal courts deemed
themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required
wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law
In thus disregarding the California decisions on this point, it is
obvious that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has unregener-
ately given way to this same impulse to declare that "Reason and
therefore Law" require him to reach decisions wholly different from
the rules of law enunciated by the California Courts.
Nevertheless, on appeal of the Todd case to the U S. Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit," the Tax Court's decision was
affirmed in a two to one decision, Judge Stephens dissenting. The
majority were careful not to repeat the statement of the Tax Court
that the Commissioner was authorized to override the legal presump-
tions established by the California decisions, although the effect of its
decision is to do just that.
However, the U S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has several times given careful consideration to the weight to be given
to such presumptions, and has reached a different conclusion. In its
19304 U. S. 64 (1938).
20326 U. S. 99, 101 (1945).
21153 F.(2d) 553 (C. C. A. 9, 1945).
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latest case, McFaddin v. C.I.R.," after reviewing its earlier decisions
on this point, it approvingly quotes from one of them, as follows:
since the ultimate tax question here depends upon the ownership ox
funds on deposit, and since the law of Louisiana is controlling, the disput-
able presumptions above mentioned are so bound together with local
property rights that the failure to apply them would result in serious inter-
ference with the local substantive law
True, the "disputable presumptions" there given effect arose out of
statutes enacted by Louisiana and Texas. But such statutes declaring
presumptions are no more weighty than a long line of judicial deci-
sions, such as those of our Court that stem from Yesler v. Hoch-
stettler in the beginning years of our state court's existence, and
given effect ever since.
It is to be hoped that when this matter is fully presented to the U S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as it manifestly was
not presented in the Todd case," it will be incumbent on that tribunal
to give effect to this presumption of the Supreme Court of Washington,
as a principle of local, substantive law If it should fail to do so, it is
to be expected that certiorari will issue from the Supreme Court of the
United States to determine the conflict between the two circuits.
I regret to have to differ from Mr. LeSourd in this one particular,
for his article, taken as a whole, is most admirable. It deserves high
praise for its thorough research and its analysis of the authorities. It is
therefore a pleasure to agree heartily with his final paragraph, in which
he states with persuasive logic that there is no warrant for the federal
courts and the Bureau of Internal Revenue to disregard the state law
on this subject. His closing paragraph would be more convincing, how-
ever, if he had stated the sound reasoning that supports the rule of our
Supreme Court and the essential inequities of the formula, so ingeni-
ously evolved by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in overcoming the
effect of community property rules.
22 148 F (2d) 570, 573 (C. C. A. 5, 1945).
22 4 Wash. 349, 30 Pac. 378 (1892).
24 153 F.(2d) 553 (C. C. A. 9, 1945).
